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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
WELCOME REMARKS:
OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT
 
 RICHARD UGELOW: My name is Richard Ugelow. I teach in the clinical 
program at the [Washington College of Law] (“WCL”). In my prior life, I 
was an attorney in the Employment Litigation Section (“ELS”) of the Civil 
Rights Division [at the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)]. Let me thank you all 
for coming today to celebrate and review forty-fi ve years of enforcement of 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).1 
A special thank you to the Dean of the Law School, [Claudio] Grossman, who 
will be here later and to the [Program on Law & Government] who kindly 
sponsored today’s program.
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment 
on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin.2  As originally enacted 
by Congress, judicial enforcement authority was the exclusive responsibility 
of the [DOJ]. Within the [DOJ], that authority was given to the Civil Rights 
Division and ultimately what became the Employment Section, the Federal 
Enforcement Section, and now today the [ELS]. 
Following the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which expanded the scope 
and coverage of Title VII, enforcement authority was divided between the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the [DOJ].3 The 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codifi ed as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-15 (2006). 
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–261, 86 Stat. 103 
(codifi ed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). 
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EEOC was given enforcement authority against private sector employers and 
the [DOJ] responsibility against public sector employers. Today’s program is 
devoted to the [DOJ]’s enforcement of Title VII. 
In his recent State of the Union address, President Obama recognized the 
Civil Rights Division, and, in particular, he recognized the important work 
[performed by] the [ELS]. That work is indeed important and that’s what 
makes today’s program important as well. 
The [ELS] litigated seminal employment discrimination cases and has 
a distinguished record of achievement. Several of those cases will be 
discussed today by the people who worked on them. The work of the Section, 
unfortunately, [has become] controversial in recent years —and not just in the 
last eight years. Politically charged terms such as: “affi rmative action,” “hiring 
goals,” “hiring quotas,” “lowering qualifi cations for employment,” “racial 
preferences,” and the like became public and part of the public discourse. The 
speakers today will discuss those terms. And if they don’t, I hope the audience 
will ask questions about them.
Let me give you an overview of today’s program. The fi rst speaker will 
be my colleague, Susan Carle, who will provide an overview of Title VII. 
Professor Carle is also an alumnus of the Appellate Section of the Civil Rights 
Division. Following Professor Carle, Professor Vicki Schultz of Yale [Law 
School], and an alumna of the [ELS] will interview Dave Rose. Dave was 
the fi rst chief of the [ELS] and a mentor and teacher to many of us. Dave will 
discuss the origins of the [ELS] and the creation of a litigation strategy to the 
development of Title VII law. 
Following Professor Schultz’s interview of [Mr. Rose], the fi rst panel 
consisting of employment litigation attorneys that litigated the early Title 
VII cases will discuss those cases and their impact of desegregating jobs, 
industries, and unions in the United States. This panel will also discuss the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., which recognized the 
disparate impact theory of Title VII liability.4 As we will see today, disparate 
impact litigation brought by the [DOJ] was the major vehicle for effecting 
workforce change. 
The second panel will discuss the uniform guidelines on employee selection 
procedures which were developed following the Griggs decision and the cases 
brought to enforce Title VII against state and local governments, particularly 
police and fi re departments. This panel includes former [ELS attorneys] and 
non-attorneys who were critical to the enforcement effort.
Finally, the last panel led by WCL Professor Bill Yeomans, also a Civil 
Rights Division alumnus and . . . my colleague here, will discuss the future of 
Title VII. This distinguished panel consists of former ELS attorneys including 
Aaron Schuham, Bob Liven, Professor Mike Selmi of George Washington 
University [Law School], and current ELS Chief John Gadzichowski. We are 
honored that Tom Perez, the current Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 
Rights Division will be our lunch time speaker. 
I also want to note the presence of Jim Turner. Jim was the career Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division for more than thirty 
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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years. He served as the acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights 
Division when the position of the Assistant Attorney General was vacant. [I] 
believe, in that capacity [he] served as the longest Assistant Attorney General 
in the Civil Rights Division. 
Finally, I want to recognize Loretta King, a WCL graduate, who succeeded 
Jim Turner as the career Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 
If she’s not here, she will be here later. I would like to mention two other 
[ELS] alumni, Ray Lohier, a recent alumnus of the Section, last week was 
recommended by Senator Schumer of New York to be nominated as a Judge 
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Ray left ELS for 
the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce in the Southern District of New York. And I might 
add that his wife is a clinical law professor at the City University of New York 
Law School. 
The second person is David Lopez. David is awaiting Senate confi rmation 
as General Counsel to the [EEOC]. He would’ve been here today had he been 
confi rmed. He promised me a future visit to the law school.
I am going to try to be a good moderator, just [and] fair as Dave Rose taught 
me. One of my goals is to leave time for questions at the end of each segment. 
Since I know everyone on the panels and I know that they are never at a loss 
for words, I face a stiff challenge, but I will do my best. So let’s begin with the 
history of Title VII with Professor Carle. Thank you very much. 
SUSAN CARLE: Thank you, Richard. Before I start I just wanted to take 
the opportunity today to say how lucky I feel we are at Washington College of 
Law that Richard has joined us here. I fi rst met him when I was a brand new 
lawyer in the Civil Rights Division longer ago than either of us wants to admit. 
And he was the Deputy Section Chief of the ELS and just a terrifi c person. He 
served as an informal mentor to a lot of junior people. Mike Selmi who will 
be here a little later was another contemporary of mine, and I think he would 
agree with me that Richard was a really inspiring role model in his fairness, 
and the care and precision that he put into his work. And so it’s just wonderful 
that we have him here now. 
So Richard asked me to discuss the legislative history of Title VII, I think 
particularly for the [benefi t of the] students in the audience. Some of this is not 
for people who are the old timers here. You would have a lot to teach me so I 
am really pitching this to students. And he wanted me to keep it brief and he 
gave me a very long list of questions he thought it was essential that I cover. 
So I will try to do both things. 
Title VII is, of course, part of a very important statute of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which had a number of titles addressing discrimination in a number of 
areas including public accommodations, education, federally funded programs, 
and employment. And as I was putting together my thoughts here I just could 
not help but [think] about the parallels between 1964 and the situation we face 
now with healthcare reform, which also, of course, is about a human rights 
issue and involves issues of race, class, gender, equality, and equity. So at the 
end of my remarks, I want to just very briefl y allude to those parallels. 
But fi rst, to take up Richard’s list of long questions, his fi rst question was: 
what led to the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act? And of course, the 
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Civil Rights Act—from my perspective—was very clearly the product of 
a social movement. A social movement that was very visible in the 1950’s 
leading to and then responding to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education and the outburst of direct action including nonviolent 
civil disobedience that came as a response to the lack of progress after Brown 
in dismantling Jim Crow’s segregation in all its forms.5 [T]hose facts are really 
imbedded in our national consciousness. But what’s not so deeply imbedded in 
historical memory is the fact that the Civil Rights movement has much, much 
longer roots, and since I write about that, I always want to focus on that. 
Title VII is really the result of activity and activism pushing for civil rights 
laws that extended all the way back into the nineteenth century. The fi rst 
statute to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and religion in private 
employment was the Ives-Quinn Act of 1945 in New York State.6  There were 
also efforts at the federal level in the ‘40s and ‘50s to use the President’s 
executive order power to enforce prohibitions on discrimination in businesses 
receiving federal contracts. And the fi rst of those executive orders was brought 
about in World War II as a result of the great labor leader A. Philip Randolph’s 
threat to President Roosevelt to call a massive march on Washington to protest 
discrimination in the defense industry while black soldiers were going off to 
fi ght and lose their lives in the war. 
In 1957, the Eisenhower administration attempted to pass a very weak, 
mild civil rights measure—but that attempt was defeated by the opposition 
of a coalition of southern conservative Democrats along with conservative 
Republicans. Then, of course, in the 1960 presidential race between Kennedy and 
Nixon, civil rights became an important campaign issue. Kennedy campaigned 
very hard for the African American vote by professing a strong commitment to 
passing civil rights legislation, but once in offi ce, he was criticized for seeming 
not to be in a particular hurry to prioritize civil rights legislation over the other 
reform legislation that he was pushing. And historians say that Kennedy was 
afraid that the coalition of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans 
would defeat this measure and jeopardize the rest of his legislative agenda. 
But when the civil rights crisis in Birmingham, Alabama arose in the spring 
of 1963 where black demonstrators, including many high school students 
and even some elementary school children, were marching for civil rights in 
defi ance of a city ban and members of the police and fi re departments attacked 
the marchers with dogs and fi re hoses knocking people over, tearing off their 
clothes, and the TV images were broadcast around the country and around the 
world, Kennedy at that point realized that he really did need to go to Congress 
and get working on legislative action. 
[T]he legislative history of Title VII, which I take here mostly from a book 
called The Longest Debate by Charles and Barbara Whalen—which is a 
wonderful book; so my account may confl ict with others including people in 
this room who know more than I do about all of this.7 So the administration fi rst 
supported a bill that was introduced in the House by the chair of the Judiciary 
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1955). 
6. N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 (McKinney 2002).
7. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE (1985).
2011]             45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT: OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII       179 
Committee, Manny Celler, a liberal Jewish Democrat from New York City 
along with Bill McCulloch, a moderate Republican from a rural district in 
Ohio with a very small African American population but a strong abolitionist 
tradition. McCulloch believed in civil rights as a matter of principle. The 
administration had promised McCulloch and the moderate Republicans to 
support a very moderate bill. But Manny Celler’s strategy on the Judiciary 
Committee was to load the bill up with as many strengthening amendments 
as possible so that when the Republicans eventually extracted compromises to 
the bill on the fl oor it would still be a strong bill.
So his proposal copied the structure of the Ives-Quinn Act in New York State, 
and it created the EEOC as an agency like the National Labor Relations Board. 
It would have a prosecutorial arm and an adjudicatory arm with authority 
to issue cease and desist orders. So by the time the bill was reported out of 
committee, McCulloch and the moderate Republicans no longer supported it 
and Celler had put the Kennedy administration in the embarrassing position 
of being against the bill the civil rights community supported and trying in 
the background to broker an agreement that would keep the Republicans on 
board. But eventually the bill that was reported out and sent to the House 
Rules Committee was stronger than the initial administration bill. And, in the 
Rules Committee, it was promptly blocked by the conservative Republican, 
and former Judge, Howard Ward Smith of Virginia, who was the leader of the 
Conservative Coalition, an avid segregationist, and a powerhouse in Congress 
notorious for his ability to block all kinds of progressive legislation, so things 
did not look good at that point.
Then, in late 1963, the tragedy of President Kennedy’s assassination 
changed the dynamics in Congress, and Lyndon Johnson, [upon] assuming 
the presidency, used the memory of Kennedy and constructed an image of his 
legacy as a strong supporter of civil rights and began to call for moving the 
bill in honor of Kennedy’s memory and legacy. And Johnson, of course, had 
voted against the Civil Rights Bill in 1957 and was a segregationist himself at 
one point, but he had become convinced of the need for the bill. And being a 
brilliant legislative strategist, he put his authority behind [it and] push[ed] for 
it. [T]hrough procedural maneuvering the bill got to the House fl oor and at this 
point, Judge Smith, who was still seeking to defeat the bill, decided to offer 
an amendment including sex as one of the prohibited bases for discrimination. 
[W]hen he made this amendment he was literally met with laughter and 
guffaw from the fl oor as if this was a ridiculous idea. So you often hear people 
referring to the inclusion of sex in Title VII as a legislative accident.  
But [from another perspective] the idea was not so ridiculous. The Equal 
Pay Act8 had passed just the year before, and there was also a social movement 
perspective or story underlying the inclusion of sex in Title VII. It was supported 
by the fi ve congresswomen in the House; at that time both Republicans and 
Democrats, strongly supported by the National Women’s Party. And ironically 
enough, Manny Celler opposed the amendment because he was afraid it would 
lead to the defeat of his legislation. 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(3) (2006). The Equal Pay Act was enacted as an amendment 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
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So there are two ways of looking at this. One is the inside story, the cynical 
attempt to defeat the bill. And another is a social movement story—which is 
thinking about how the women’s rights movement seized on the opportunity to 
piggyback on the wave of support for civil rights to add their issue to the civil 
rights agenda as well. [I]n the end the bill passed the House overwhelmingly 
by a vote of 280 to 130 in a very strong bipartisan effort. But everyone knew 
the Senate was going to be a very different story and there, and this will sound 
familiar, the Democrats did not have a cloture proof supermajority—[at the] 
time that required sixty-seven votes. It’s been changed since then. And in the 
case of the Civil Rights Act, much more so than even the healthcare issue 
today, not all Democrats supported the bill. 
So the Senate Judiciary Committee had the bill for a long time, was ignoring 
it, and the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfi eld from Montana assigned the 
bill handling to the Democratic whip who was Hubert Humphrey, the Senator 
from Minnesota who had been fi ghting for strong civil rights legislation since 
1948 and had big political ambitions to stake himself out as a liberal Democrat 
who could get things done, and, of course, became Johnson’s vice president 
in 1965. And Humphrey was opposed by the Democratic opposition led by 
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia who directed the southern voting block. 
But Humphrey worked assiduously to get the votes and worked on cultivating 
the ego of the moderate Republican minority leader Everett Dirksen from 
Illinois and telling Dirksen that his help on this bill would be the source of his 
historical legacy. 
So together they avoided the bill going to the Judiciary Committee where it 
would have been sunk. And Dirksen, at the same time, was using his strategic 
position to negotiate for compromises to the bill. Then, of course, the Senate 
fi libuster began—and this was the longest fi libuster in the Senate’s history— 
[and] it lasted two and a half months [w]ith proceedings [that] continued well 
into the night. Our own alum Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia was one of 
the more notorious participants in the fi libuster, though I believe he later said 
he regretted his role in this. He gave fourteen hours of speeches on the Senate 
fl oor. [A]t the same time, Dirksen was trying to maneuver behind the scenes 
to change the bill, but Johnson was resisting him. And the public perception of 
what was going on in the Senate began to become more and more negative. So 
that public perception, the pressure from the public on the Senators engaging 
in the fi libuster, and the legislative handling skills by the bill supporters in the 
Senate eventually led to the votes for closure being there—seventy-one votes—
four more than needed, and, of course, this just got the bill up for discussion 
on the merits in the Senate. 
And at this point, two sets of compromises called the Dirksen-Mansfi eld 
Compromises in the form of a substitute bill modifi ed some aspects of the 
bill. And one of the things that the substitute amendments did was to give 
state and local governments more authority to enforce the bill to placate the 
Republican’s federalism concerns. But the most signifi cant compromise in the 
bill was to strip enforcement authority from the agency that was created under 
the statute, the EEOC, taking away its adjudicatory power, its power to issue 
cease and desist orders so that the EEOC only had authority to investigate 
and attempt to conciliate complaints, but had no litigation authority in the 
2011]             45 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT: OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII       181 
courts, so that after the EEOC was done with its efforts the complainants were 
essentially on their own in terms of trying to seek enforcement of the bill’s 
provisions in court. [T]he only government litigation authority, of course, 
was granted to the Department of Justice in Section 707 of the Act and that 
power was limited to cases in which Justice detected a pattern or practice of 
discrimination.9 And as I’ve discussed in my course with my students, that’s 
why you see the early government-litigated cases against private employers as 
pattern or practice cases. 
[S]upporters [of the bill] also got some important things and one of them, 
I think, was the attorneys’ fees provision which allowed private litigants to 
get their attorney’s fees if they prevailed against a defendant in a case. So the 
passage of Title VII was a huge victory, but there were obviously signifi cant 
weaknesses in the legislation and the passage was by a very large margin, 
seventy-three to twenty-seven with forty-six Democrats in favor, twenty-one 
against, and twenty-seven Republicans in favor of the bill. Richard [has] already 
talked a little bit about the 1972 amendments. There were efforts to fi x some of 
the weaknesses in the bill that went on for some years unsuccessfully, and then 
in 1972 Congress was able to fi x Title VII. First of all by authorizing the EEOC, 
as well as individuals, to litigate in federal court and extending coverage of 
Title VII to the state and local employees and strengthening the coverage of 
federal employees. And, of course, as Richard has already mentioned, the 1972 
Act gave the DOJ the power to sue state and local employers for employment 
discrimination and it did a few other things as well that I won’t go into. 
But it occurs to me that when we look back on this [and compare it] to 
our situation today, we see how long it really took, and how inadequate or 
imperfect attempts and successes were, and how some of them, at least, were 
fi xed later—which I think are comforting thoughts when we think about our 
next big super statute initiative of today. But also there [are] really some 
signifi cant differences and those include the strong bipartisanship that was 
necessary to enact Title VII and the Civil Rights Act, the coalition building 
across the aisle, the idea of voting your conscience or voting on principle, and 
also the huge role of a President with enormous legislative experience and 
really tough, wily, hardball political skills. 
So when we look back at passage of Title VII forty-fi ve years ago from 
our current perspective and our concern about today’s legislative log jams, 
I think we can even better appreciate the importance, and the enormous 
accomplishment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and also the key need for having 
a working political system that allows us, as a country, to take . . . and make 
progress on pressing human rights issues. Thank you. 
RICHARD UGELOW: Thank you so much Susan. I wish I could take 
your course. It’s really a pleasure to welcome back Vicki Shultz to the law 
school. She was here about . . . two years ago, and [she] spoke at a faculty 
lunch on Friday and it was just wonderful. And she also, the next day, 
spoke at the fi ftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Division event held at 
another law school in town. Vicki is the Ford Foundation Professor of Law 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2006).
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at Yale University Law School. Her areas of expertise include employment 
discrimination, civil procedure, feminism in the law, and gender and 
work. I’m not going to read her list of publications because we’ll be here 
until tomorrow. Sitting next to her is Dave Rose. I mentioned Dave earlier 
in my remarks. Dave started in the Department of Justice in what year? 
 DAVE ROSE: 1956. 
RICHARD UGELOW: 1956 in the Civil Division of the Civil Rights 
Division. From 1969 to 1987 he was Chief of the ELS, and he’ll tell you how 
he got to that position. And at various points he was the Special Assistant to 
the Attorney General for Civil Rights. Some of the cases that Dave worked on 
include Griggs v. Duke Power which I mentioned and we’ll hear about, Local 
189, United Papermakers v. [United States],10 Contractors Ass’n [of] Eastern 
Pennsylvania,11 which involved the Philadelphia Plan,12—which I hope we’ll 
be able to touch upon —Albemarle Paper v. Moody,13 [EEOC] v. AT&T,14 and 
Bazemore v. Friday;15 and that’s only the beginning of the list for Dave. I’m 
going to turn this over to Vicki because you don’t want to hear me talk about 
Dave when Dave can talk about Dave much better than any of us can. So thank 
you very much. 
VICKI SCHULTZ: Thank you so much, Richard. I can’t tell you how 
honored I feel to be here. It’s one of the great honors of my life to be able to 
interview Dave Rose today—one of my greatest mentors and someone whose 
belief in me as a young person has really stuck with me and empowered me 
throughout my life. So with that, let’s start with your transition over from the 
Civil Division. You were recruited to work in the Civil Rights Division in 
1967 by John Doar, and hired as the Special Assistant to the Attorney General, 
then Ramsey Clark, and charged with coordinating the efforts of the federal 
agencies under Title VI. You did a lot of really important employment cases 
during that period, and I would just love to hear you talk about one or more 
of them. 
DAVE ROSE: I [was initially recruited] by Bob Bowen who [was] 
a contemporary of mine but died a number of years ago. [He was] a very 
10. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
11. Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 1971).
12. See Exec. Order No. 11246, § 202(1), 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), as amended 
by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967), 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969), reprinted 
as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (2006) (“[Government] contractor[s] will take 
affi rmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated 
during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”); 
see also Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., 442 F.2d at 163 (observing that the “Philadelphia 
Plan” was the Secretary of Labor’s implementation of Executive Order No. 11246 & 11375 
as to the fi ve-county Philadelphia area). 
13.  422 U.S. 405 (1975).
14. 36 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
15. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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important person in the Civil Rights Division and the person who recommended 
to John Doar that I be selected for some position. He tried once a couple of 
years before [1967], maybe in [1966], I’m not sure, the second time there was 
a position and it was a super grade. I had been a GS-15 at the advanced age 
of 34 or something like that. I had been in the Appellate Section for several 
years and argued a number of cases and those cases led to a case involving 
mandamus and that led to the Labor Department coming to Justice and asking 
us to represent them in contractor cases involving [the Offi ce of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs]— the executive order program. 
In any event, I got selected. I was told my job description was Title VI, 
which most of you know does not involve employment matters and expressly 
disclaims coverage of employment matters although the ultimate interpretation 
[of the] law sort of contradicts that. But whatever it was, Title VI was not 
employment. But there were two agendas for the Civil Rights Division. The 
stated objective was the coordination provision, but John Doar had told me 
that what he really wanted to do was to bring some employment cases. So I 
did both, even though that wasn’t the job description, and I had a very small 
group of two lawyers working for me when I was a coordinator—and Dave 
Martin was [t]here. He is here and was one of the two. In any event, I did a 
lot of different things, and I did do a number of Title VI [cases] but I also 
got involved with the Papermakers case because that involved the threatened 
strike by the white union against Crown Zellerbach in Bogalusa, Louisiana. 
And I had worked defending the decision of the Labor Department which 
Crown Zellerbach had tried to overturn so I was the logical person to deal with 
the threatened strike. And the long and short of it was one of the most exciting 
days I had in my career. 
There was a threatened strike. We talked about fi ling before the fi rst day of 
business in January because that was when the threatened strike was. I drafted 
the complaint. I showed it to John Doar. I brought it upstairs, and I forget who 
signed it, but I brought it upstairs and got Ramsey Clark to sign it, got on the 
airplane and fl ew to New Orleans. [W]e had called and told the Judge we were 
coming, and he said he wanted to see us [and] we notifi ed the Papermakers’ 
lawyer who was also from Washington. We met with him that evening and 
talked about the case. We had the argument the next day. Judge Heebe was 
not known for making quick decisions, but he was confronted with it and as 
he was about to sign the order, the [Temporary Restraining Order] (“TRO”), 
he said, “I’ve never enjoined the union before,” and I said something like, 
“Well you’ve never had a strike that was based on preservation of segregation 
in violation of Title VII before either” and he said, “I guess that’s right.” He 
signed it and we got it entered. Getting the TRO was the whole thing. We 
had a formal trial, I think, a couple of months later that lasted a day or two. 
We got a preliminary injunction and ultimately a permanent injunction and 
that case advocated the disparate impact theory partly because the employer 
wanted to do the right thing and partly because it was the logical thing to 
do. And no I didn’t invent the disparate impact theory. It was the [Harvard] 
Law Review article by Cooper and Sobol, I believe, a year or two before, 
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that laid it out, and we lawyers heard at least about the law review articles.16 
 VICKI SCHULTZ: [That’s] comforting.  
 DAVE ROSE: And I had fi gured out what the theory was by the 
time I got the job. So anyhow, that one worked very well, [and it was] 
very exciting, . . . because I was doing the Executive Order stuff [and] 
it was a bridge to Title VII, but it was a case that did both a Title VI-like 
contract and the purposes of Title VII, but we fi led it under Title VII. 
 VICKI SCHULTZ: Okay, so Mr. Doar wanted you to focus on employment 
and [then] the Division fi les six employment suits in 1967, twenty-six 
more in 1968, and establishes very important precedents like Local 189 of 
the United Paper Workers and Local 53 v. Vogler17 and there are a couple 
of other really important cases that establish the disparate impact principle. 
And you say in your Vanderbilt Law Review article18— which I recommend 
if you haven’t read it—these cases are very important in establishing 
this principle by the time Griggs v. Duke Power goes up to the Supreme 
Court. So I wanted you to talk a little bit about that and talk about your 
involvement and the Division’s involvement in Griggs v. Duke Power. 
 DAVE ROSE: What I remember about the Griggs case was that Dennis 
Gordon and Frank Petramalo—Frank is here, I don’t know if Dennis is here 
or not—had written a memo to me when the Court of Appeals decision came 
down, or they visited me and said the government ought to be supporting the 
petition. And I said, “[w]ell write something” and that was my normal reaction. 
So they did, and I liked it, and it made sense, and so I talked to Jerry Leonard, 
and I gave him the memo. Jerry Leonard, the Assistant Attorney General, was, 
on the whole, a very good boss because he tended to look at your work and try 
to make a decision on it and do it promptly in contrast to a number of other 
Assistant Attorney Generals that we’ve had. So I gave him the paper and I 
didn’t hear anything. I may have asked him about it once or twice, but he 
didn’t tell me anything. 
So, it sat there on his desk or some place and nothing happened until April, 
or something like that, [and] the Supreme Court issued an order requesting 
participation of the government. And so we had the petition ready, Jerry took 
it out, looked at it, we talked about it for a few minutes, he signed it, brought 
it up to the Solicitor General’s Offi ce, and we sued. 
VICKI SCHULZ: I’m going to switch to affi rmative action now. So 
affi rmative action has a long history and it begins with a series of federal 
16. George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment 
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 1598 (1969).
17. Local 53, Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
18. David Rose, Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1989).
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executive orders which leads to President Kennedy’s 1961 Executive Order 
10,925, the precursor to 11,246, commanding federal contractors to take 
affi rmative action to ensure equal employment opportunities. 19 
So the executive order is given teeth and tested by the Philadelphia 
Plan. So, I think you were still Special Assistant [to the Attorney 
General] then. Could you tell us about your involvement?  
 DAVE ROSE: I’m not sure. No, I think I was the Chief of the Section 
although if you read the case you can’t [tell]; I’ve re-read it recently and I had 
a title that was not Section Chief, although I’m sure I was. I became Section 
Chief in September [1969] when Jerry Leonard and Dave Norman decided 
that we should have functional sections rather than geographical ones. So I 
was clearly the Section Chief. I’m not sure how that title got appended to the 
decision, but I did argue it. 
In any event, we had some fans in the Labor Department by then because of 
the Papermakers case, and I believe the Solicitor of Labor invited us to defend 
them again, and we did. It wasn’t a particularly diffi cult case to win. I believe 
that Judge Higginbotham in the District Court was the only African American 
judge and a very smart man. And drawing him was either very great good 
fortune or somebody was pulling some wires, but I believe it was just luck. 
In any event we had him. I was delighted to see him. He had us in chambers 
and he had no problems with the plan and the contractors appealed of course. 
That was not a diffi cult piece of litigation but was important because there 
was a series of other regional affi rmative actions plans like the Philadelphia 
Plan that helped a little bit to desegregate those unions. They remained 
very strong, and very resistant, and primarily white. And I really have not 
looked at any demographics for those unions in recent years so I don’t really 
know how much good we did but we tried and got some good law in.  
 VICKI SCHULTZ: And was the Third Circuit precedent that upheld the 
Philadelphia Plan important to the Section in later being able to incorporate 
goals and time tables into the relief?
DAVE ROSE: Yes. It gave me enough intestinal fortitude to use goals and it made 
it hard for anybody to say no because we’d publicly taken that position. Thank you, 
that’s a very important transition. I had been very, very careful about pushing that 
envelope too far, and maybe I was overly conservative in that regard.  
 VICKI SCHULTZ: So in [1969] you become Chief of the Section, which 
is now reorganized into the functional reorganization.  And the next fi ve or six 
years [after this reorganization] are an extraordinarily productive time in which 
the Section successfully prosecutes path-breaking pattern or practice cases 
against several major industries including trucking and the steel industries. 
Could you tell us a little bit about the trucking lawsuits and how this early 
industry-wide litigation infl uenced the climate of enforcement for Title VII? 
19. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
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DAVE ROSE: The fi rst trucking case I had was Roadway Express,20 and 
I learned there that there were city drivers and over-the-road drivers and, in 
some parts of the south, the city drivers were black and the over-the-road 
drivers were white. But in some parts of the south, where the pay was very 
good, the whites had both jobs. Places like Memphis had a number of black 
drivers but almost all of them had been hired before ‘57 or ’58; so they were 
sort of merged into seniority lists. In any event, Roadway was a suit we tried to 
get—and did get—a preliminary injunction in Cleveland. We prevailed in the 
lawsuit. The numbers were thousands and thousands of white drivers and zero 
or, almost zero, black over-the-road drivers. One didn’t have to be a whiz at 
math to fi gure out what was going on. And it was somewhat akin to the voting 
cases. I mean it was an unspoken rule, but it was almost universally followed 
by the interstate carriers. So we had one trucking case. We could’ve had as 
many trucking cases as we did, and we brought several, and then we decided 
to [go] amass [the] rest of the major companies in one suit. 
Bob Moore, who is not here, was doing the steel industry and had the case 
against U.S. Steel,21 and he had, I think, proposed doing it, and that was a 
much smaller number of employers, a handful of steel makers —the national 
case—and I think I took his idea, but I’m not positive of that. So those are the 
only national cases that we had. The law had been changed and we retained 
authority to bring new suits through ‘74 under the ‘72 Act, but we were being 
put out of the private sector business. And that was disappointing for me; and 
Vicky and I think that was at least, in part, a mistake. But I do think it would’ve 
been a bit much to have [DOJ] do all of the pattern [or] practice cases, but I 
don’t think it was necessarily bad that EEOC could do it, but I think it was a 
mistake to put us, the Justice Department, out of business in that area. 
Clarence Mitchell was the long-time sponsor of the Civil Rights Act and a 
very great man, but he had worked for the War Labor Relations Board during 
World War II, I believe, and therefore, his model [was] the NLRB and [a 
policy of] administrative review. So what we got in Title VII, [as] previously 
explained, was a dual system—a sort of mixture. 
VICKI SCHULTZ: So I’m going to skip over some really important cases 
against police and fi re departments and state agencies because I know that’s 
going to be the subject of a panel later this afternoon. And I would like to 
skip to, I think, the late ‘70s. Now, when I joined the Section, which was 
in 1983, I would hear Section lawyers say that at some point prior to that 
time, Section lawyers had “rolled like Sherman through the suburbs.” So, 
I was just wondering if you could tell us about how the emphasis on suing 
suburban government employers such as the Chicago and Detroit suburbs 
or even the St. Louis or Houston suburban school districts developed, and 
whether you think the Section’s suburban initiative was successful? 
 
20. United States v. Roadway Exp., Inc. 457 F.2d. 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
21. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
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 DAVE ROSE: Well, let’s start with the word Cicero, and not the person, but 
the town that is adjacent to Chicago and you have the answer. 22 Cicero had 
a resident requirement and Cicero kept out black residents. So you had to be 
a resident to be a municipal worker and no black residents allowed means no 
black employees. Anyhow, I was asked about the Cicero case by somebody who 
brought the housing case, Sandy Ross, and I saw him in the hall one day and he 
said, “Dave, I got a question for you” and I sa[id], “What?” He said, “What do you 
think about having a Title VII count against Cicero?” And I said, “I think that’s 
a good idea.” Bill Yeomans is here. I think he worked on the Cicero case, and he 
argued once, I remember once to my annoyance, (laughter) not because it was 
you but because I wasn’t given the assignment in the Court of Appeals.  
 BILL YEOMANS: As I recall, you came along. 
 DAVE ROSE: I did. (chuckles) I felt much better after you spoke than I did 
before.  
 VICKI SCHULTZ: Tell us what those cases were about for people who 
may not know? 
 DAVE ROSE: Cicero is the exemplar [because] you’ve got one side of the 
street [that] is Cicero and the other side of the street [that] is Chicago. And 
the side that’s Chicago is black and everything, I guess, [that’s] to the east is 
white. So we learned quickly after the Cicero case that there were a heck of 
a lot of other towns that had adopted residency requirements in the ‘50s or 
the early ‘60s and they were all around Chicago. All of Cicero’s neighbors 
had—all of them is a little bit strong, but most of them had—adopted the same 
rule and the closest thing to Cicero in the Cleveland area is Parma, Ohio, also 
a city in Sicily.23 So we went there and we found them springing up all over 
the place so we had a whole group of cases in Illinois, not as many in Ohio, 
and one in East Haven—near New Haven, I believe.24 So, those cases were 
almost cookie cutters; they didn’t involve a lot of intellectual resources but 
persistence, because the mayors were willing to settle those cases because they 
did not want to lose the next election. 
So when I left the Justice Department, there were a whole bunch of cities that 
hadn’t been sued by [the DOJ] and so the Rose Law Firm and ultimately Rose 
& Rose brought a bunch of those. And I have one going right now. There’s 
[a case] called NAACP v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue which has 
hired one black fi re fi ghter out of about 300, and that person was hired because 
we had brought a suit against North Bergen and he was hired as part of the 
settlement of the suit against North Bergen.25 And I think the legal [counsel] 
was the Justice Department. 
22. United States v. Town of Cicero, 786 F.2d 331 (1986).
23. NAACP v. City of Parma, 616 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1981).
24. NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 998 F. Supp. 176 (D. Conn. 1998).
25. 707 F. Supp. 2d 520 (D.N.J. 2010).
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VICKI SCHULTZ: Wow. Okay. There’s so much I’d love to ask you 
but we don’t have all day so I’ll try to skip ahead here, sadly. [S]o skipping 
to the early 1980s, Assistant Attorney General Brad Reynolds argues for 
and seizes on passage of dictum in the Stotts26 case to support the idea that 
Section 706(g) of Title VII prohibits the award of any race-conscious relief 
to anyone who’s not proven to be an individual victim of discrimination.27 
[T]hen relying on this misreading of Stotts, the Section takes the position—
or Mr. Reynolds does—that the government’s fi fty-one consent decrees are 
contrary to Title VII. So, looking back on it in hindsight, did the Reagan 
administration represent a turning point in the Division’s history, one that set 
it on a road to a future, which is now our present, in which time honored 
understandings of civil rights have been undermined in your view?  
 DAVE ROSE: Well, I think it was an effort in that direction. I don’t think 
it had that result. We remember Chuck Cooper, and Mike Carten, and Brad 
Reynolds had no notions of that kind when he came in and for the fi rst couple 
of years w[ere] bringing the same kinds of suits that we always brought. But 
in the later part of the Reagan years—I call them zealots but that’s a little 
derogatory—but people who had very strong views on that began to become 
important people in [DOJ], and Cooper was Brad’s fi rst assistant and then 
became an Assistant Attorney General himself. A very smart guy, a very 
ambitious guy, but his views and mine were not the same. 
So the late ‘80s was when I left and the two or three years before that the job 
had become very uncomfortable for me. I’d had thirty years of service. I stayed 
about a year and a half longer to see some of the suburban litigation programs 
through. That reading of Title [VII] is not correct and was not; I don’t think it 
has become law.
VICKI SCHULTZ: No, it’s repudiated by 
the Supreme Court in the [Local 28] case.28  
 DAVE ROSE: Right. Doug Heron [is] here, and I’m very happy to see him. 
And we talk from time to time, and I believe you’re going to be hearing from 
him in the near future and I’ve got to talk about the case with Frank Johnson 
against the State of Alabama. I did that case before the ‘72 amendments became 
effective.29 And we had a unique theory which I think was mine but I’m not 
sure. Anyhow there was a provision attached to the receipt of federal funds 
from [the Committee on Health, Education, and Welfare] which required all 
the government programs to be nondiscriminatory. And, of course, Alabama 
had not signed that contract, or they may have signed it but they didn’t enforce 
it. So we brought a case based on that theory. The passage of the ‘72 Act was 
imminent, so it wasn’t a secret to Frank Johnson, but he took our complaint 
26.  Firefi ghters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (2006).
28. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codifi ed as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(e-17)).
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and acted on it before the enactment of the ‘72 Act and that was 
another sort of exciting day to fl y down to Montgomery and fi le 
a case. But he was delighted to see a representative of [DOJ] there.  
 VICKI SCHULTZ: Wonderful. Okay, so I’m going to turn to a few sort of 
broader questions about the work of the Section now. One thing that I read in 
Brian Landsberg’s excellent book Enforcing Civil Rights30 is that John Doar 
began training Civil Rights Division lawyers in what he called the immersion 
method, in which lawyers were expected to know everything there is to know 
about federal law, all the precedents, all the local customs, and especially 
all the facts digging very deep as we conducted our own investigations. 
And it seemed to me that you were training lawyers in this same method 
when I joined the Section many, many years ago. So I wanted to ask if you 
self-consciously set out to train lawyers in the Section in that way? 
 DAVE ROSE: Well, I did because what John Doar was doing and what the 
Civil Rights Division was doing was really almost unheard of for lawyers. We, 
John fi rst, but I fi gured out what the Division did, and I thought it was exactly 
the right thing to do. So yes, we tried to train because there’s no better way to 
fi nd the facts than to talk to the people who are harmed, many of whom were 
afraid to act by themselves, and talk to the employer also if you can to get both 
sides and get the information you need to decide whether you’ve got a lawsuit. 
That’s very extraordinary. That’s a lesson, I believe, that our friends at EEOC 
had not learned. I’m not saying none of them had learned it, but that, I think, 
is one of the strengths of the Division and certainly it was one of the strengths 
of the Employment Section. Richard’s getting very uncomfortable. 
RICHARD UGELOW: Okay, Vicki has one more question. 
 VICKI SCHULTZ: All right, since I only have one more it’s hard to choose, 
but as a workplace the Section was, for me, hands down the best place I’ve ever 
worked. Things weren’t always perfect all the time, but we were reasonably 
well integrated along race, sex, age lines. We had wonderful leadership in 
which lawyers got the help they needed but also had some autonomy, and we 
had an amazing esprit de corps where everyone worked hard but also played 
hard together. So, I guess, it seems to me that the Section was a model of 
the kind of equality that we wanted other employers to create. And I think 
probably everyone here would be interested in knowing how you created such 
a wonderful, welcoming, and model workplace? 
DAVE ROSE: Well, I don’t think I created it. I think the people who came 
to work for us were an exceptional group. We had an embarrassment of riches 
in terms of able people willing to work hard and doing something important. 
And probably the easiest time was the fi rst fi ve or ten years; easiest not 
physically or mentally, but easiest to do. But once the attitude was established, 
30. BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1997).
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I think it is somewhat self-perpetuating because when a new lawyer came in 
I’d typically send him or her off with an experienced lawyer to work on an 
investigation, or something of that kind, and to see and experience what we 
were doing. And so I didn’t create it. We were fortunate to have a time when a 
lot of intelligent people wanted some change made. The change is slow—very, 
very slow; embarrassing[ly] slow; was and is. There was dramatic change and 
things are [continuing to change]—I never thought I’d see a black president in 
my lifetime. I’ve got to say, not due to us, that the fact that we’ve had it shows 
that a lot of progress has been made, but some of the traditions are very, very 
fi rmly in place and very hard to detect and overcome. So I don’t think the 
battle’s won by any means, but I think that what the Section did was something 
we all can be very proud of. 
END TRANSCRIPT
